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INTRODUCTORY.
--- 000---
After a thorough invest igation of the effects of a
failure by the vendor to change possession, more esperially
as it related to personalty, it will be found to occupy
a very prominent place in the law of fraudutlent conveyan-
ces. This class of cases arises where the creditor has
levidd on the goads in the, possession of the debtor, and
the vendee comes forward and attempts to claim such goods.
The daoctrine has its faundation in the Statute of 1 ,Eliz-
abeth ca. 5, which is the foundation of all our madern
statutes and judicial decisions on the subject of fraud-
ulent conveyances in this counitry. BY its provisions all
conveyances and dispositions of property, real or personal
made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors
are void and fraudulent as against such creditors.
The fact that the vendor remained in possession of the
goods is acknowledged by all jurisdictions to be evidence
of the fraudulent intent, but the coutts are far from being
harmonious as to what weight shoulId be given to such evi-
dence. Some courts hold that retention of possession is
only prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent and is
a question for the jury to deeide; while others hold that
the mere retention of possession is fraud per se and a
question of law for the aourt to decide. The former is by
far the prevailing rule; the latter is followed by Pennsyl-
vania and a few other States.
Since the courts of Pennsylvania hold that retention
of possession is fraud per se and a question for the ecurT
to decide, it will be the purpose of this article to trace
the Pennsylvania decisions on this point,-giving the reas-
ons for their holding, and presenting such modifications
of the broad general rule as the public policy of this
State seems to demand.
RETENTION OF POSSESSION AS EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
IN PENNSYLVANIA.
-...- 000---
ACTUAL CHANGE OF POSSESSION REQUIRED. The subJeet of
retention of possession, in Pennsylvania, may be said to
date from the decision of Clow v Wood, 5 S.& R.275, 1819 ).
Chief Justice Sharswood in 3c Kibbin v Martin, 64 Pa. 552,
has justly aalled Clow v Woad, "the imagna charta of the law
of Pennsylvania, on fraud in the transfer of possession".
It was said in Clow v Wood, "that the Statute of 1 Eliz.
does not in words declare a conveyance of goods fraudulent
where the vendor remains in possession- but in general terms
renders void all conveyances made to the end, purpose, and
intent of defrauding creditors". This case established
the broad prilcwple that retention of possession of goods
by the vendor, after the title to such goods has been trans-
ferred to another, is conclusive evidence of fraud on the
vendor's creditors or innocent purchasers from him. It is
irmmaterial whether or not a fraudulent intent existed: the
mere fact of remaining in possession of the goods with the
vendee's consent, if such goods are reasonably capable of
delivery, is fraud per se and a quest ion of law for the
2court to decide.
In all the cases bearing on this subject it is argued
that publi c policy should induce such a comprehensive con-
struction of the Statute of 13 Eliz. as to take in all cases,
except those where the goods are incapable of delivery, or
where the change of possession would defeat fair and honest
objects to be affected thereby. The earlier cases of Wilt
v Franklin, 1 Binn. 502; and Dawes v Cope, 4 Binn. 258, ac-
knowledge the principle that retention of possession was
fraud per se, but they confined its application to narrow
limits. The courts have always clung to the decision of
Clow v Wood, 5 S.&R.275, and it is now an inflexible rule
which makes it fraud per se if the possession does not fol-
low as well as accompany the transfer: Young v Ma Clure, 2
W. & S. 147; or as is said in Streeper v Eckert, 2 Wh. 382,
"if there be any principle established by these cases, it
is that a transfer of personal property unaccompanied by a
corresponding transmutation of possession is void as against
creditors". To the sane effect see Babb v Clemson, II S. &
R. 419
If A sells goods to 13, and A remains in possession of
the goods, and they are capable of delivery, such goods are
3liable to levy and sale by the creditors of A, and the sale
between A and B will be declared fraudulent as a matter of
law. See Ioofner v Clark, 5 Wharton 545, where the vendonk
kept and fed the horse in the same stable as he did before
the sale: Carpenter v Mayer, 5 Watts 483, where the vendor
kept goods in the same house. To the same effect see Young
v Me Clure, 2 W. & S. 150, sale of oxen; Cadbury v Nolan,
5 Pa. 320, sale of timber: Forsyth v M,11athews, 14 Pa. 100,
sale of bar-fixtures; Dewart v Clement, 48 Pa. 413, sale of
canal boat; Bar v Boyles, 96 Pa. 31, sale of machinery;
Hulbert v Simons, 20 W. N. C. 15, sale of safe.
Milne v Henry, 40 Pa. 31, being a complicated case, may
warrant the facts in being set out in full. A, a merchant.,
having failed, bought goods on credit as agent of his wife.
These goods were not paid for out of her own money. She
now sold the store to her brother B, the consideration be-
ing a $500. note: but no money on it was paid. No inven-
tory of the goods were made, the same sign remained in the
window, same clerks were employed, and there was no outward
visible change of possession. A remained in the store at-
tending to business in the same manner as before the sale.
Goods were levied upon by the creditors of A . Held, that
4as the property first purchased was not paid for by the
wife's own money, she had no title to the goods, but the
ownership was in her husband A, and the sale or pretended
sale to B was fraudulent because A remained in possession
of the goods.
All these cases come to the conclusion that retention
of possession is fraud per se and a question of law for the
court to decide. They say that the possession of personal
property is prhma facie evidence of ownership, and that un-
der the appearance of this ownership, every man is justified
in regerding him as still being the owner, and in giving
him credit or extending indulgence to him on account of it.
In Streeper v ERk.ert, 2 Wharton 367, it is argued that if it
were permitted under such circumstances to withdraw the
property from the seller's creditors, it would work injus-
tice to such creditors, because it may be fairly presumed
to have influenced them in giving credit to the party. How-
ever, it is not necessary that the creditor should assert
or prove that he was deceived by the false appearance of
ownership. " It is ir~material whether or not the creditor
trusted the debtor on the strength of the goods being in
the debtor's possession". Martin v Machoit, 10 S. & R. 214.
5The mischief is tho swne because it would often be a very
difficult task for one nan to prove what induced him to give
credit to another. As a general rule, however, the poss-
ession of goods by the debtor has always been a material
point in inducing cr edit.
The Pennsylvania courts have always been very favor-
able to creditors and bona fide purchasers. They have
therefore maintained the doctrine that in order to prevent
the community from being deceived by an apparent ownership
in property, after the title to such property has been
transferred, the person in whom the title rests must take
the property into his exclusive possession, or in some pub-
lie way exercise rights of ownership over it. If the ven-
dee allows the property to remain in the hands of the ven-
dor, the vendor's creditors can seize it. The same rule
applies to conditional sales, and if the vendor delivers
possession of the property to the vendee with a reservation
that the vendor may recover the property upon the failure
of the vendee to pay all the purchase money, it becomes li-
able to execution by the vendee's creditors: Rose v Story
1 Pa. 1bc; Waidron v llatipt, 52 Pa. 4O83 I-aak v Tinderman,
64 Pa. 499; Emver v Van Griesen, C W. N. C. 363: Stradtfelt
6v Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53; Brunswclk v Hoover, 95 Pa. 503.
But if A the owner of goods leaves them in the possession
of B as bailee of the goods, such goods are not liable to
levy and sale by the creditors of B: Edward's Appeal, 105
Pa. 109. In order to determine whether the contract is
one of bailment or conditional sale, we must ascertain,
from the terms of the contract the intent of the parties:
Enlow v Klien, 79 Pa. 488. It may be convenient for the
parties to agree that the vendor should remain in possess-
ion, or in a conditional sale that the vendee should have
possession, and these contracts will be enforced by the
courts as between the parties- but when the rights of third
persons are affected by giving credit to the vendor when
he retains possession of the goods, or by giving credit to
the vendee when such vendee has possession of the goods un-
der a conditional sale, the rights of such third persons
are paramount. Heretofore I have been treating of the
sale as being declared fraudulent as against the creditors
of the vendor in possession, and I have shown that where
the vendor remained in possession, the sale was fraudulent
as to his creditors. We found also that the same rule ap-
plied to the vendee in possession under a conditional sale.
7Suppose now, that the vendor in possession sells the goods
to an innocent third party who takes the goods into his own
possession. Will such third party get good title as against
the first purchaser? In Shaw v Levy, 17 S. & R. 101, A
sold goods to B, but A retained possession of them. A now
sold the same goods to C, a bona fide purchaser, who took
possession of the goods. In a suit between B and C to de-
termine who was to have the goods, the court held that the
goods belonged to C. "As between the first purchaser and
the vendbr the property belonged to the purchaser; but when
it passed to the hands of a bona fide second purchaser,
without notice, it would be against sound policy to allow
the first purchaser to recover". This decision was based
on the theory that where one of two innocent parties must
suffer, he who is the cause of the loss must bear it. The
vendee having permitted the vendor to remain in possession,
the vpndor was enabaled to cormit fraud on innocent third
parties, and the vendee must bear the loss. The, cases say
this principle has its foundation in the common law, and is
not necessarily dependirng on the Statute of Eliz. In Davis
v Pugh, 32 Pa. 242, G sold: lumber ,to- M who inmmediately .made
a contract with G to run it to market. It was left with
SG until he started to run it; G on the way sold it to B.
Held, B got good title. The decisions are followed in
Grawford v Davis, 99 Pa. 576; and Miller v Browarsky, 130
Pa. 372. The same rule applies where the vendee in poss-
ession under a conditional sale, sells the goods to an in-
iooent third person. "It is the sene with a conditional
sale; for the retention of possession is essential to re-
tention of a lien on personal property". Waldron v Haupt,
52 Pa. 408. In Stradtfelt v Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53, A bought
and took possession of goods, payment to be made on instaljl
ment plan. There was a written contract to the effect
that the titleto the goods was to remain in the vendor till
the payment of the full purchase price. Before the pur-
chase price was paid A sold the goods to B , an innocent
third party, who had no notice of the reservation of title
in the original vendor. Held, B got good title, and the
first contract was fraudulent as to innocent third person.
WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF POSSESSION? The gen-
eral rule is that there must be an actual change of poss-
ession, but there are numnerous occasions on which an actual
change is not required. In such cases constructive poss-
9ession is sufficient. The delivery must be actual and
such as the nature of the property sold, or the eircumstan-
ces of the sale will reasonably admit. Separation of the
property from the vendor's possession means only a change
of his relation to it as owner, and consists in the sur-
render and transfer of his power over it to the vendee. If,
however, the goods are capable of actual delivery a con-
structive delivery will not be enough: Bellingsley v White,
59 Pa. 464. But it often becomes difficult to determine
whether or not certain acts will warrant a finding of eon-
structive change of possession. In such cases the jury is
to decide the question, and in doing so it takes into eon-
sideration the character of the property, the nature of the
transaction, the position of the parties, and the intended
use of the property. See Grawford v Davis, 99 Pa. 576;
Ilc Clure v Folney, 107 Pa. 414. In Bond v Bunting, 78 Pa.
210, it is said that goods in the hands of a carrier, or
stored in a warehouse, may be delivered by the delivery of
the bill of lading or the warehouseman's receipt. A sale
of goods in the hands of a bailee is good against an execu-
tion creditor, although there is no actual delivery, if the
vendor does not retake possession'Tinton v Butz, 7 Pa. 89.
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To the same effect see Whigham's Appeal, 63 Pa. 194. In
Barr v Reitz, 53 Pa. 256, the owner of household goods sold
them, moved out of the house in which they were, and deliv-
ered the keys to the purchaser. Held, "whether the goods
were removed from the house in which the owner remained,
or the owner removed from the house in which the goods re-
mained, the visible relation between them was b~roken and
the public was put on its duty to inquire". In Hugus v
Robinson, 24 Pa. 9, there was a sale of a store, the vendee
continuing to do business in the old stand. The court in
determining whether there was a sufficient change of poss-
ession said,"is it- contrary to public policy for one who
buys a store of goods, to continue to do business in the
same place"? It was held to be a sufficient change of
possession. To the same effect is the case of Benford v
Schell, 55 Pa. 393, where it was held that the delivery of
the keys of a safe and the keys of the room in which it was,
would be a sufficient delivery of possession. But where
there are several piles of lumber that are incapable of de-
livery, they should b~e marked at once with the name of the
owner or they will be liable to levy by the vendor's cred-
itors: Long v Knapp 54 Pa. 514. In all these cases there
11
is held to be a sufficient change of possession if the ven-
dee will exercise such a control over the goods as will
reasonably indicate to all the fac* of a change of owner-
ship. Chief Justice Sharswood in .Me Kibbin v Martin
64 Pa, 357, surs s up some of the cases of constructive
possession in these words; "if the articles of sale are not
capable of delivery, then a constructive delivery will be
enough. As in the case of a vessel at sea, goods in a
warehouse, a raft of lumber, a kiln of bricks, etc." See
also Cadbury y Nolan 53 Pa. 520; Chase v Ralston , 0 Pa.
5390 Clow v Wood, 5 S. & R. 275; Renninger v Spartz, 128
Pa. 524. "This rule is applied as the circumstances re-
'I
quire in order to make its, application just: Stephans v
Gifford 137 Pa. 219.
POSSESSION MUST BE TAIKN WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND
BE CONTINUOUS. The decisions are uniform in holding that
the change of possession must take place at the time of the
sale, or within a reasonable time thereafter. See Carpen-
ter v Mayer, 5 Watts 43 Babb v Clemon, 10 S. & R. 419.
As to what is a reasonable time depends upon the circumr-
stances of each particular case. If there is a sale of a
12
vessel at sea, the possession should be taken as soon as it
conveniently can after its arraval: Morgan v Biddle, 1
Yates 33 if the vendee takes possession before execution
was ismed against vendor it will be sufficient: Woofsmith
v Cope, 5 Wharton 58; where A bought household goods from
B, and B was going to occupy the same house, the fact that
A remained in possession six days would not make it fraud
per se: Barr v Reitz, 53 Pa. 256; in sale of household fur-
niture the purehasers were looking for a house for three
weeks after the sale, held, that a judgment taken out eight
months after such sale could not be collected out of such
goods: Smith v Stern, 17 Pa. 360.
The change of possession must be continuous in the
vendee and if the property gets back to the possession of
the vendor it will be liable to execution by vendor's cred-
itors. Where a vendee of oxen, after keeping them in his
possession a few hours, returns them to the vendor as a se-
curity for a loan, they are liable to levy and sale by the
vendor's creditors: Young v Ma Clure, 2 W. & S. 147. "In
all cases where the delivery has b een temporary and follow-
ed by a return to the seller, the law regards it as color-
able and fraudulent in law" : Garman v Cooper, 72 Pa. 32.
13
There is a retention of possession in the meaning of the
law, in all ordinary cases where the property comes back
to the late owner shortly after the transaction in question:
Miller v Garman, 69 Pa. 134; Me Clure v Folney, 107 Pa.414:
but if the goods remain in open and notorious possession of
the vendee for a considerabole length of time, and then get
back to the possession of the vendor, the court cannot de-
clare such transaction void in favor of vendor's creditors.
Dunlap v Bournonville, 26 Pa. 72; Mc Marlan v English, 74
Pa. 296; Bond v Bronson, 80 Pa. 360.
If the vendee, after a delivery of the goods, allows
the vendor to again have possession of such goods, and the
vendor sells them to a bona fide purchaser, such purchaser
will get good title: Davis v Bigler, 62 Pa. 242.
CONCURRENT POSSESSION. The transfer must be actual,
continuous, and exclusive in the vendee; concurrent poss-
ession is evidence of fraud. "It is mere mockery to put
another person to keep possession jointly with the former
owner": Bab1b v Clemson, 10 S. & R.. 428 see Bawn v Kellar,
43 Pa. lO6 Miller v Garman, 69 Pa. 135. Judge Agnew in
Warman v Kraner, 73 Pa. 379, defines concurrent possession
14
to be, "where the control and use of the goods by the ven-
dor and vendee are so mixed up and confused as to leave the
'question of possession uncertain". If the vendor occupies
the same relation to the property as he did before the sale,
the court will pronounce it fraudulent per se. See Hoof-
per v Clark, 5 Wharton 545; Brawn v Kellar, 43 Pa. 104;
Stellwagon v Jeffries, 44 Pa. 407; Snyder v Shuh, 10 WN-O.
136; Mc Kibbin v Martin, 64 Pa, 352.
But there are cases of concurrent possession where the
court will not pronounce such possession as being fraudu-
lent per se; as for example, where there was a sale from
father to son, and the son having removed the goeds to an-
other place where his father continued t6 live with him,
and do small jobs about the premises. In such a case "it
certainly was not necessary for the son to turn his father
out of doors": Mc Vicker v May, 3 Pa. 224. In Hugus v
Robinson, 24 Pa. 9, the vendee purchased the drugstore for
his son, the son having been a clerk of the vendor. The
sign having been changed, the son took possession and em-
ployed the vendor as manager. Held, not a concurrent poss-
ession as to make the transaction fraudulent. In cases of
postnuptial settlements by the husband to the wife, there
15
is necessarily a concurrent possession: Larkin v McMullin,
49 Pa. 29, or where the wife bought goods from the husband
in good faith, and she paid for them with her own money:
Skinner v Iroh, 4 Pa. 204. See also Dunlap v Bournonville,
26 Pa. 72, where the vendor remained as foreman; Billings-
by v White, 59 Pa. 464, where vendor remained as clerk;
Ziegler v Hendrick, 106 Pa. 87, where vendor had desk room
in the store; Rothermel V Marr, 98 Pa. 285, where vendor
and vendee were brother and sister living in the same house,
In all these cases the court would not pronounce the con-
current possession as fraudulent per ee, but if there were
any facts tending to show that the vOndor retained any ben-
efibial interest in the business, or took money from the
till to pay his own debts, or that such of the proceeds of
the business went to him as was beyond a reasonable compen-
sation for his services,- these were reasonable questions
of fact for the jury and it might be justified in finding
that the transfer was not bona fide. See Stull v Weigle,
20 W.N.C. 98.
This class of cases is not looked upon very favorably.
bcy the courts and it will take but very slight evidence to
have them declared fraudulent. Judge Agnew, in Barr v
16
Reitz, 53 Pa. 258, said Dunlap v Bournonville, and Hugus
v Robinson, supra, "stand on the very outer edge of settled
principles". In Mc Kibbin v Martin, 64.Pa. 381, C. J.
Sharswood, after acknowledging that the vendee may employ
the vendor as his agent in conduating the business, said,
"I frankly confess that I have not regarded this line of
decisions with favor", lie followed these cases not be-
cause he believed they were just, but because, "I have been
too long an the bench C 25 yrs.)Inot to have learned the
lesson- that a judge has no right to adhere to his favorite
opinions after they have been reversed or overruled".
JUDICIAL SALES. Hereatofore I have been treating of
the retention of possession after private sales. We now
come to a discussion of the cases wherein the judgment debet-
or, after a sale on execution, retains possession of the
goods with the consent of the vendee, and we find a dis-
tinction between private sales and judicial sales. The
theory, on which retention of possession by the vendor is
in a private sale declared fraudulent, is that such sales
are known only to the inmmediate parties; but in a judicial
sale every person is bound to take notice of the transfer
17
of the title, and hence there can be no uncertainty as to
who is the true owner. Therefore a retention of possess-
ion by the former owner of a chattel sold at sheriff's sale
is not an index of fraud: Walter v Mc Clellan, 4 Dallas
2083 Staller v Kirkpatrick, I Mona,43G; Bellas v M Carty,
10 Watts 44; Meyers v Harvey, 2 P. & W. 478; Lathrop v
Wightman, 41 Pa. 297; Craig',s Appeal 77 Pa. 443; Smith V
Cristman, 91 Pa. 430; Miller v Irvine, 94 Pa. 405. This
class of.cases often arises where the purchaser is a rel-
ative of the judgment debtor and the latter is allowed to
retain possession of the goods as a matter of charity or
benevolence. The permission of the debtor to remain in
possession, "is certainly a humane and generous arrangement;
and if done in good faith, deserves commendation rather
than censure": Rolard v Brooke, 127 Pa. 144. But if the
goods are bought in with the debtor.'s money, the goods will
be liable to subsequent executions against him: Walter v
Germant, 1 Pa. 515; or if one buys cloth at a sheriff's
sale and leaves it with the debtor to be made up for debt-
or's own use with the understanding to account to the pur-
chaser for the price, it is a sale to the deb tor and is
liable to execution: Dic2 v Lindsay, 2 Grant 431, and Dicki
18
v Cooper, 24 Pa. 217- or if the chattel is capable of con-
sumption and Is left with the debtor for his own use and
consumption, it becomes liable to creditors: Heitzman v
Divil, 11 Pa. 264. If it cannot be shown that the pur-
chaser meant to relinquish all claim over the goods when he
allowed the debtor to remain in possession, the subsequent
creditors may seize such goods: but if there Is only a mere
possibility of the debtor. repurehasing the goods, his cred-
itors have no claim on them: Maymes v Atwater, 88 Pa. 496;
Bisbing v Third Nat. Bank, 95 Pa. 78. The purchase and
retention of possession must both be made in good faith.
If then, the judgment creditor is subsequently paid the a-
moumt of his debt in full, the goods in possession of the
judgment debtor are liable to levy by another creditor:
Scott v Chancellar, 20 Pa. 195. Neither is there a pre-
sumption of fraud where the debtor remains in possession:
Walter v Germant, 13 Pa. 515, for "the law does not repeal
such charity by any presumption of fraud so as to authorize
the seizure of those goods as the property of the debtor"..
Maynes v Atwater, 88 Pa. 476.
At a very early date the courts wereASSI GNMETS.
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called upon to decide whether or not assignments for the
benefit of creditors were to be placed in the same category
with judicial'sales. In the early cases of Cunningham v
Neville, 10 S. & R. 204; and Hower v Geeseman, 17 S. & R.
251, the court held that retention of possession by the as-
signor was fraudulent per se. Assignments were placed on
the same footing with private sales- the court citing Clow
v Wood, 5 S. & R. 275, with approval. But it must be re-
membered that the latter case was not the case of an as-
signment, but was the case of retained possession by the
mortgagor of a chattel mortgage. That retention of poss-
ession by the assignor was declared fraudulent in the early
cases, can be accounted for only by the fact that they were
decided. but a few years after Clow v Wood. This case
seemed to be so extensive in its terms as to include judi-
cial sales and assignments; but as has been shown by the
late cases, this intended strictness has not been rigidly
enforced. An honest assignment to secure a pro rata dis-
tribution among all the creditors should be fostered. If
the goods are to be held in °trust for all the creditors,
nothing would be more unju~st than to allow some one of themi
to levy on the goods and have the assignment declared fraud,
20
ulent because the assignor remained in possession. One
creditor has no more claim on the debtor's goods than an-
other. Nothing can be more honest on the part of the
debtor, than to pay all his creditors alike by a general
assignment for their benefit, and the law should not, there-
fore, demand a change of possession of the goods if all
have an equal interest in them. These early decisions may
have influenced the Legislature somewhat, for in 1836 an
Act was passed requiring an inventory of all the assigned
goods to be recorded within thirty days from the day of as-
signment. The retention of possession in a private bill
of sale is made fraudulent on account of the secrecy of its
nature: but since the recording act for assignments, this
objection is removed, and assignments are now placed with
judicial sales. It is the publicity of the transaction
that puts them on the same footing with Judicial sales:
Dallai v Fitler, 6 W. & S. 323; or, as is said in Fitler v
Maitland 5 W. & S. 309, "there can no more be a sham sale
by a general assignment than there can be by an execution".
Since the Act of 1836 all persons are held to have con-
structive notice that the assignee has the title to the
goods, and the early cases of Cunningham v Neville,
21
10 S. & R. 204; and Howes v Geeseman, 17 S. & R. 251, are
overruled. At the present time it is well sattled that
the mere fact of the assignor. remaining in possession of
the goods, after the assignment, is not fraudulent- either
during the thirty days allowed for recording or after the
assign ent is recorded: Fitler v Miaitland, 5 W. & S. 309V
Mitchell's Appeal, 2 W. & S. 253; Bellas v Me Carty, 10
Watts 44; Klapp's Assignme- v Shirk, 13 Pa. 588. The as-
signment takes effect immediately on the execution of the
instrument and it makes no difference whether or not the as-
signee had notice of the assignment: Wiekersham v Nickol-
son, 14 S. & R. 118; neither will the assigrnent fail be-
cause there has been a failure to appoint an assignee, in
such case equity will appoint one: Mark's Appeal, 85 Pa.
231.
The assignment must be bona fide in order that the as-
signor may remain in possession. But the mere fact that
the assignor in possession is employed by the assignee to
manage the business or take care of the goods is not fraud-
ulent in itself: Deckard v Case, 5 Watts 22, because "it
would frequently be disastrous to the creditors jif the as-
signor was excluded from the possession and management of
22
property": Fitler v Maitland 5 W. & S. o309.
CHATTELi MORTGAGES. At connon law all sales, pledges,
and mortgages of personal property were void as to third
parties, umless the possession acaompanied and went with
the vendee, pledgee or mortgagee. Where the mortgagor
retains possession of the goods and exercises a power to
dispose of them for his own benefit, it is an effectual
shield to a dishonest debtor, for such authority is incon-
sistent with the idea of a security; and if there can he
no real certain security, there can be no certain lien.
Even under the recording statutes they may work an injus-
tice on innocent purchasers from the mortgagor in possess-
ion, because it is against the custom and general under-
standing that purchasers should exanine the records pre-
vious to purchasing personal property.
The common law idea of chattel mortgages has undoubt-
edly secured a firm foothold in Pennsylvania, for it is
said in Euwer v Van Gliesin, 6 W.N.C. 363, that "in Penn-
sylvania, chattel mortgages are not sanctioned. The cozn-
mon law rule prevails that one man shall not have a lien
on personal property owned by and in possession of another
23
as against oreditors and innocent purchasers". In Clow v
Wood, 5 S. & R. 275, A executed a chattel mortgage to B.
A remained in possession and continued to exercise owner-
ship over the goods.. Subsequently A's creditors levied
on the goods and sold them. under execution. Held, that
"the mortgagor's possession under the transaction was
fraudulent per se and void against bona fide creditors".
If then, the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to remain in
possession, he does so at his peril, for it is said, "that
a mortgagee out of possession has no priority over a cred-
itor who has obtained a lien": Merchant's Bank v R'y. Co.
4 W. N. C. 264. See also Fry v Miller, 45 Pa. 4410 Bis-
mark Association v Bolster, 92 Pa. 123. This rule ex-
tends to contracts made in other States; and a mortgagee
in Maryland who permits the mortgagor to retain possession
of the mortgaged goods knot found in Maryland), and the
mortgagor brings them into Pennsylvania where he disposes
of them to a bona fide purchaser, such purchaser gets good
title to the property: MacCabe v Blymyre, 9 Phila.R. 625.
If, however, the purchaser has notice of the mortgage, he
cannot claim the goods as against the mortgagee: Cobb v
Nonemaker, 78 Pa. 501.
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Heretofore we have been treating of mortgages not pro-
vided for by statute. The Legislature has passed several
Acts allowing the mortgagor of chattels to retain possess-
ion of them on complying with certain requisites of the
statutes. Thus by the Act of 1855 it was made lawful for
the lessees of collieries, manufactories and like premises
to mortgage their leases, machinery, etc. By the Act of
1876 chattel mortgages for not less than $5O0. were allow-
ed on saw-logs, sawed lumber, laths, shingles, oil in bar-
rels or reservoirs, iron ore, canal boats, etc. This Act
having expired in five years by its own limntation, it will
be found subsequently re-enacted by the Act of 1887. By
the Act of 1891, chattel mortgag es for not less than $100.
may be given on cement, boilers, engines, oil, nails, iron
sheets, gas and artesian wells supplies, etc. Such mort-
gages must be in writing signed by the mortgagor and duly
acknowledged the same as deeds and mortgages of real es-
tate. They are to be recorded and remain in effect one
year unless renewed within thirty days previous to their
expirat ion.
The mortgagor of all such articles enumerated by
these statutes may retain possessipn of such articles and
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the mortgage will be good against his areditors and bona
fide purchasers from him, the fact of recording being a
constructive notice to everybody that the articles are
mortgaged.
CHATTELS REAL. Chattels real form another except-
ion to the general rule that retention of -possession is
conclusive evidence of fraud. It has on several occas-
ions been argued that chattels real should be placed on
the same footing with chattels personal. In the early
case of Penna. v Kirkpatrick, I Add. 193, there was very
strong dicta to that effect. The court in this case said
that a lease of lands is considered as a chattel- and a
conveyance of a lease unattended with possession is fraud-
ulent. This case is criticlsed in Williams v Downing, 18
Pa. 65. Judge Chambers said, "much as we respect the
opinion of the learned judge in that case on a question of
law, yet, without his usual. accuracy and discrimination,
he confounded the law in relation to personal chattels with
that of chattels real". The rule as laid down in the dic-
ta in Pennsylvania vs Downing, was never followed; while on
the contrary it has been decided on several occasions that
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retention of possession by the lessor, after a sale of the
lease, was not fraudulent: Ludwig v Highly, 5 Pa. 141;
Avery v Street, 6 Watts 247; Alletown Bank v Beck, 49 Pa.
409; Williams v Downing, 18 Pa. 60; Benninger v Statz, 128
Pa. 524.
-..THE END.---
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